UNJV}. 'RSJTY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 347 and Anthony Kennedy. Like prior swing Justices, O'Connor and Kennedy are sensitive to social and political forces. 14 For example, O'Connor, according to her brother Alan Day, "doesn't like to be part of polarizing decisions ... 'she takes it hard and feels it hard."' 15 Kennedy is purported to pay careful attention to how his votes will impact his and the Court's reputation. 16 In other words, these justices seem to look to signals sent to the Court by elected officials, elites, and the American people in sorting out their opinions.
This Essay is divided into two Parts. The first Part details how the Rehnquist Court has consistently heeded social and political forces in its decisionmaking. The second Part focuses on the Grulter decision. It describes the majoritarian forces that helped sway the Court and explains how the Court's decision reflects those social and political influences.
I. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE
Constitutional decision making is a dynamic process that involves all parts of the govemment and the people as well. 17 As Chief justice William Rehnquist noted, the "currents and tides of public opinion lap at the courthouse door," for judges "go home at night and read the newspaper or watch the evening news on television; they talk to 14 William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-AnaZvtic Pmpective, 58 J. POL. 169, 197 (1996) (finding that moderates on the Court, who tend to be swing votes, have the greatest response to changing public opinion). See also text accompanying notes infra 18, 93-120 (detailing the social and political forces that contributed to the Court's deliberations in the Grutter and Gratz decisions). 11 ' Evan Thomas & Stuart Taylor, Jr., She Helped America Seek a Middle Ground on the Thorny Subject of Race, NEWS\\'EEK,July 7, 2003, at 46, 49 (quoting Alan Day) . 16 Comments made by Justice Kennedy in an October 1992 interview provide support for this claim. In explaining why it is '"dangerous"' for a Supreme Court Justice to think "'himself a philosopher,"' Kennedy remarked: '"History has its own way of unfolding, tripping you up or vindicating you. You're required to look into a crystal ball, but you don't see much there."' Jerry Carter, Crossing the Rubicon, CAL. LAW, Oct. 1992, at 39, 104 (quoting Kennedy (2003) (explaining that if"one looks at the history of the Court, the country, and the Constitution over a very long period, the relationship appears to be more of a dialogue than a series of commands"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185 REV. , 1186 REV. (1992 (stating that effective judges engage in a dialogue with other branches of government).
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EXPLAINING GRUTJER V. BOLLINGER 351 their family and friends about current events." 18 Supreme Courtjustices also "reflect . . . the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's members are usually drawn." 19 "[O]verwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually at the nation's most elite universities," 20 the views of economic and social leaders matter more to the Court than to popularly elected lawmakers (who must appeal to popular sentiment in order to win elections). In particular, since the justices' reputations are shaped by the media, law professors, and somewhat left-leaning lawyers' groups such as the American Bar Association, they maximize their status by taking elite • • • 21 opmwn mto account. Lacking the powers of purse and sword, moreover, the Court cannot resist "a determined and persistent lawmaking majority;" it can only put its preferences in place against "a weak m<Bority." 22 In sorting out their personal views of how the Constitution should be interpreted, some Supreme Court Justices consider whether elected officials will comply with decisions. 23 These Justices have weaker prefer- REv. 751, 768 (1986) . It is true that some Justices care passionately about an issue and, thus, are unlikely to be swayed by majoritarian forces. But other Justices (often the swing Justices who cast the decisive votes) have relatively weak preferences. It is likely that these Justices are more apt to take into account the potential political fallout of a decision. 19 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting) . For a parallel commentary suggesting that the Court's ruling in Romer was fueled by cultural elites, see Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution, 68 U. COL. L. REv. 409,409-10 (1997) . 20 Klarman, supra note 4, at 189. 21 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Veering Left: The Art of judicial Evolution, NAT'LJ., July 5, 2003 , at 2154 (noting recent decisions are contrary to the media depiction of the Court); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions (1998) (unpublished working paper) (concluding that it would be a mistake to assume that judges are less susceptible to reputation and public approval than other decision makers), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/schauer/judicial.htm. For an argument that "heavy criticism" of Bush v. Gore "led to a term of unpredictable decisions" in which several Justices took "unexpectedly centrist positions," see Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious Fallout from Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, atA15. 22 Dahl, supra note 3, at 286. 23 ences about the substantive issues before the Court and, consequently, are more willing to take account of the views of elites, elected officials, and the American people. 24 The Supreme Court's practice of operating within parameters established by majoritarian forces is also tied to the judicial appointment process. Nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Supreme Court Justices are products of the social and political forces at the time of their nomination. This process "favors persons with ambivalent, unknown or centrist views on the hotly contested issues of the day;" those with known "militant views ... need not apply."25 Furthermore, even though Supreme Court Justices are insulated from political pressures such as election, several Justices have held elected office or worked closely with elected officials. 26 These Justices are accustomed to taking into account the views of interest groups, the American people, and other elected officials.
For its part, the Rehnquist Court follows this historical pattern. Social and political forces explain both its hesitancy to embrace the social conservative agenda and its willingness, at least from 1995 to 2002, to break significant doctrinal ground on federalism. 27 Consider, reactions from the Legislative and Executive branches); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies andResistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585, 588 (1983) (stating that in response to resistence of citizens and public officials to the Court's holding in Brown v. Board ofEducation,judges were forced to approve "imperfect remedies, remedies that [did] not fully vindicate rights). For a competing perspective, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD j. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 315-16 (2002) , which contends that Justices only care about personal preferences when casting their votes. For additional treatment of this point, see text accompanying notes infra 90-91, 122-24. 24 for example, the Court's federalism revival. Why did the Court limit Congress' power based on federalism principles, and why did it wait until 1995 to begin its revival? What prompted the Court to extend its somewhat ambiguous initial rulings into bolder statements about the limits of Congress' power? Why has the Court excluded race and gender from its Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five revolution? In answering these questions, it is useful to look to the majoritarian influences that shape the Justices' understanding of Congress and their power to limit Congress. Majoritarian forces that have given the Court both reason and incentive to limit Congress include the (then) ever-growing populist distrust of big government, the increasing willingness of candidates to embrace anti-Congress rhetoric, the Contract with America-spurred 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the unwillingness of members of Congress to take issue with or even discuss Supreme Court decisions limiting federal powers, and the failure of interest groups to feel sufficiently threatened by the Court's anti-Congress decisions to mobilize in opposition to them. 28 Social and political forces, especially Congress' support of civil and abortion rights, have also figured prominently in Rehnquist Court rulings on social issues. Unlike its federalism revival (where a coalition of five Justices joined forces to limit Congress' power), Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have refused to sign onto the conservative social agenda. Their refusal is almost certainly tied to majoritarian signals sent to the Court. From 1981-1992, for example, the Reagan and Bush administrations sought to reshape constitutional law through judicial appointments and Justice Department arguments.
!'
These efforts, however, were strongly resisted by Congress, interest groups, and O'Connor and Kennedy, in particular, consider social and political forces when making decisions). 28 PROBS. 121, 121-22 (1993) . 36 Kennedy, of course, filled the seat that Bork would have occupied. Souter (who 2003] EXPLAINING GRU1TA'R V. BOLLINGER 355 is a barometer of interest group and populist sentiment, Bork and subsequent confirmation battles made clear that the vigorous pursuit of social conservative causes would spill over to elections and otherwise fuel the ongoing culture wars. In this way, lawmakers signaled to the Court that the pursuit of social conservative objectives would come at a price, such as legislation overturning Court rulings and the rejection of conservative nominees. The Casey plurality took these social and political forces into account. Emphasizing the costs of "overrul [in g) under [political] fire" and linking the Court's "legitimacy" to the "people's confidence in the Judiciary," 37 the Casey plurality tied their refusal to do the bidding of the President who appointed them to the Court's "legitimacy."
On civil rights, Rehnquist Court decision making also reflects majoritarian forces. Consider the following: the Reagan administration succeeded in only 43% of the Supreme Court cases it participated in (as compared to the Solicitor General office's average success rate of 70%). In sharp contrast, the Court agreed with Clinton administration filings 74% of the time. 38 In other words, the conservative arguments of the Reagan administration were far less successful with the Rehnquist Court than the more liberal arguments of the Clinton administration. Social and political forces figure prominently in understanding the relative success rates of the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In particular, inept policymaking and a lack of political resolve plagued Reagan administration efforts to narrow civil rights protections and eviscerate affirmative action. Witness the Reagan Justice Department's failed campaign against affirmative action. By condemning those who "worship at the altar of forced busing and mandatory quotas" 39 and calling racial preferences had no paper trail) was appointed, in part, to avoid the kind of confirmation battle that was fought over the Bork nomination . It is also noteworthy that Ronald Reagan's detem1ination to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court resulted in the nomination of Sandra Reagan and his Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Brad Reynolds, launched a morally and rhetorically divisive campaign against preferences. But this absolutist campaign against preferences met stiff resistance from Congress, interest groups, state and local officials, big business, the media, and, ultimately, the courts. For example, when the Justice Department asked states and localities to join it in challenging longstanding affirmative action consent decrees, mayors and governors almost always criticized the Department (and lower court judges uniformly turned down the Department's efforts). 41 More significantly, in 1989, the Reagan administration galvanized Congress and civil rights groups by trying to restore tax breaks to racially discriminatory private schools and by opposing bipartisan efforts to make disparate racial impact an important evidentiary tool in voting rights cases.
42 affirmative action programs. For their part, the press and big business strongly backed affirmative action. Twenty of twenty-one "top papers" rejected Reagan Justice Department efforts to dismantle affirmative action.
46 Big business has also been a consistent supporter of affirmative action. For reasons ranging from avoiding costly lawsuits to improving a company's public image to increasing productivity, "[b] usinessmen like to hire by the numbers. " 47 By 1986, the year Rehnquist became Chief Justice, the Reagan Justice Department's campaign against affirmative action lay in shambles. Unable to tap into populist disapproval of racial quotas, Justice Department attacks on racial preferences were portrayed as insensitive and mean spirited.
48
Rebukes by Congress, interest groups, and the press reinforced the desire of most department and agency heads to leave in place existing affirmative action programs. 49 Even the White House distanced itself from the Justice Department's campaign against affirmative action. Refusing to undo an executive order requiring 325,000 government contractors to adopt affirmative action plans, the President preferred speaking about his administration "strongly support[ing]" programs that "provide special assistance to minority businesses."50 Consistent with these social and political forces, the Supreme the Reagan administration's civil rights policies"). 46 Court rejected the Department's claim that all preferences were immoral and illegal. Initially, the Burger Court approved a range of hiring and promotion schemes that benefited racial minorities and 5I women. The Rehnquist Court, undoubtedly aware of the political maelstrom surrounding affirmative action, largely followed its predecessor's lead. Its initial constitutional rulings were a mixed bag. In 1987, it ruled, in United States v. Paradise, that a requirement of one Mrican American for one white promotion is a constitutionally permissible remedy. 52 In 1989, it concluded in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. that state affirmative action plans are subject to strict scrutiny review.
53
The very next year, however, it ruled that federal affirmative action plans are subject to mid-tier review. This ruling, lvfetro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 5 4 is especially instructive in understanding the linkage between majoritarian forces and the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. By filing an amicus brief in the litigation and, more importantly, enacting legislation blocking Reagan FCC reconsideration of diversity preferences, Congress embraced these affirmative-action programs. 55 The first Bush administration also signaled its support of these preferences, albeit in a less clear way. Following the lead of the Reagan administration, the Bush Justice Department formally opposed affirmative action. 56 However, the 51 Even when ruling against affirmative action (as it did in Wygant, 476 U.S. 267), the Court rejected Justice Department efforts to limit affirmative action to the actual victims of discrimination and, in so doing, handed a "significant victory [to] civil rights groups." Al Kamen, High Court Ruling Signals Suppart for Affirmative Action: Groups See Victory in Teachers' Case, WASH. POST, May 20, 1986 , at AI (discussing the Wygant opinions which "showed a strong majority [of the court] in favor of affirmative action, in general, and in agreement on 'central core principles."'). For an overview of Reaganera Supreme Court decision making, see Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 360-78 (1989) ; Schwartz, supra note 46, at 527-37. 52 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (holding that the "one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes."). Also in 1987, the Court refused to consider constitutional issues when approving-{)n statutory grounds-an affirmative action plan that granted preferences to women seeking promotions . .Johnson v. President also facilitated the vigorous defense of racial preferences in Metro by appointing three FCC Commissioners who strongly favored diversity preferences and promised to defend those preferences in court. 57 Also, rather than have the Solicitor General (who is statutorily authorized to control FCC Supreme Court litigation) block the FCC from defending diversity preferences, the administration authorized the FCC to represent itself before the Supreme Court.'' 8 Finally, Bush distanced himselffrom Reagan justice Department policies. Two weeks after his inauguration, he expressed disappointment with the Court's just-issued Croson decision, speaking of his "commit[ment] to affirmative action" and his support for a narrow reading of the decision. 59 Elected govemment officials signaled their support for minority interests in other important ways during the Bush years. By commissioning "disparity studies" that supported claims of continuing discrimination in public contracting, states and municipalities were able to minimize Croson's impact. 60 Even more significantly, the bitter battle over Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination underscored opposition to the social conservative agenda by powerful civil rights interests and their supporters in Congress. Additionally, after officials in the Department of Education questioned the constitutionality of government-funded minority scholarships, the President made clear that he disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the question was one "for the courts to rule on." 61 Finally, Bush signed on to lawmaker efforts to invalidate the Rehnquist Court's earlier restrictive preferences in Metro as "precisely the type of racial stereotyping that is anathema to basic constitutional principles"). 57 ld. at 177. 58 See id. at 178 (noting that the Solicitor General "allowed the FCC to serve as the government's principle voice in the case."). The Bush justice Department did file an amicus brief opposing racial preferences. For additional discussion about the Bush administration's possible reasons for adopting these conflicting courses of action, see id. at 177-78. 59 The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 Uan. 27, 1989 readings of civil rights statutes. 62 By overruling six of these Rehnquist
Court decisions, the resulting statute, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, "was designed to be, and was, a massive rebuke to the Court."fi 3 Against this backdrop, unsurprisingly, the Rehnquist Court shifted its energies away from affirmative action and other social issues and toward federalism. By denying certiorari to most cases involving divisive social issues, more liberal Justices who feared conservative outcomes teamed with swing Justices (like O'Connor and Kennedy) who are not strongly committed to the conservative social agenda. 64 (2000) . The Rehnquist Court had also agreed to hear another follow-up to Adarand; at the urging of the second Bush administration, however, it dismissed the case as "improvidently granted." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) . The Court also agreed to decide whether employment discrimination statutes allow a school board to consider race when terminating a teacher. This case, Piscataway Township Board of .Caucation v. Taxman, was dismissed after a coalition of civil rights interest groups joined together to settle the case with the teacher who filed the lawsuit. 522 U.S. 1010 (1997), cert. dismissed. 66 See supra text accompanying notes 41-51 (describing the contentious struggle between the Reagan and first Bush administration , and those civil rights' groups and like minded public officials over attempts to limit the scope of affirmative action)) .
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EXPLAINING GRlflTER V. BOLLINGER 361 affirmative action was indeterminate and often unintelligible. 67 The Court's sole Clinton-era decision, Adarand, 68 followed this pattern. On the one hand, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting by concluding that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny review. 69 At the same time, Adarand referred to the "unhappy persistence" of race discrimination and the power of the government to act "in response to it." 70 By ruling in this way, the Court sought to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 71 Moreover, by refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the federal affirmative action plan in Adarand, the Court was quickly (and correctly) dismissed as "very nearly beside the point" and "insignifican[t]" because it "settled nothing." 72 Furthermore, the Court's refusal to hear numerous post-Adarand challenges to affirmative action in public education gave state and federal officials free reign to sort out the constitutionality of affirmative action. Eight years after Adarand, the Supreme Court reentered the fray with Grutter. As the next Part of this essay will detail, Grutter, like prior Rehnquist Court decisions on affirmative action, conformed to social and political forces. These forces have always supported affirmative action. Consequently, just as the Rehnquist Court responded to majoritarian pressures by rejecting the social conservative agenda in the years before its federalism revolution, the Court in Grutter once again issued a decision that echoed the pressures beating against it.
II. EXPLAINING GRU7Tt,'R V. BOLLINGER
By linking Rehnquist Court affirmative-action decisions to the social and political forces influencing the Court, the prior Part underscores the pivotal role that m~oritarian influences play in Supreme Court decision making. This Part will focus on the Court's recent approval of affirmative action in Grutter. Initially, it will track the ongoing support for affirmative action by elected officials and other interest groups, starting with elected government's response to Adarand and culminating in the Grutter litigation. Following this examination of majoritarian influences, it will discuss the ways in which social and political forces seem to have impacted on the outcome and reasoning of both Grutter and Gratz.
* * *
In the years following Adarand, federal and state officials condemned race quotas but continued to support affirmative action. Although Clinton repudiated both proportionate representation of minorities in Congress and overly rigid preference plans/ 4 he argued that Adarand "actually reaffirmed the need for affirmative action." 75 Through a White House-conducted affirmative-action review, the Clinton administration concluded that nearly all affirmative-action programs are responsive to discrimination, do not unduly burden non-minorities, and accomplish their objectives of increasing opportunities for minorities and women. 75 The Clinton administration, moreover, resisted a Fifth Circuit ruling prohibiting affirmative action in higher education. The Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and the Department of Education considered rescinding federal funds given to schools that eliminated affirmative action programs. 77 For its part, the pre-Grutter George W. Bush administration had signaled its qualified support of affirmative action. Even though Bush ran on an anti-preference platform, he campaigned in Mrican American communities, stated that racial progress was "still too slow," and "went to the NAACP convention and apologized for [the Republican party's] mistakes on civil rights." 78 Once in office, he assembled a cabinet "every bit as diverse as former President Clinton's." 79 Bush also reached out to minority voters by pursuing policy initiatives on voter fraud and racial profiling, as well as reappointing two Mrican American judges (initially picked by Clinton) whose nominations the Republican Senate had stalled. 80 In August 2001, the administration 76 See Ann Devroy, Clinton Study Backs Affirmative Action: Five-Month Reviw Supports Some Reforms, WASH. POST, July 19, 1995, at A1 (summarizing the administration's conclusion that the "vast majority" of affirmative action programs were beneficial and should continue). Immediately after Adarand, government agencies were told that, "[n]o affirmative action program should be suspended prior to" an evaluation of the program's constitutionality. Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel171, 202 (1995) ; see also Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 482 (2000) (suggesting that the Clinton administration advanced its affirmative action agenda by, among other things, misreading Bakke). 77 agreed to defend the constitutionality of a federal affirmative-action program before the Supreme Court.
81
Congress has also backed affirmative action. For example, following the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, several key Republican leaders tried to move affirmative action off the legislative schedule. Correspondingly, motivated both by a desire "to craft a positive message for minorities" and a corresponding fear that a fight over affirmative action would delay their pursuit of the Contract with America reforms,82 Republicans in the House and Senate voted down proposals to roll back federal affirmative-action programs. 83 A bill targeting racial preferences in higher education, for example, was soundly defeated because "'a majority of the Republican Conference realize[d] that the GOP would lose popular electoral support when it support[ed] anti-affirmative action measures." 84 Indeed, with new census data suggesting that Republicans need to attract the growing number of working women and Hispanic voters, Republican lawmakers are more likely today than ever before to support affirmative action. 85
State support for affirmative action, with few exceptions, has also been steadfast. Although voters in California and Washington, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, amended Mter a 1996 backlash against the California anti-affirmative action initiative resulted in a Republican party loss of majority control of the state Assembly, 88 Republican lawmakers vigorously and successfully opposed similar ballot initiatives. 89 Anti-preference interests responded to this rebuke by turning their attention to the courts (at least before Grutter).
By the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear Grutter and Gratz, state and federal support for affirmative action was stronger than ever. For this reason, there was little prospect of the Court embracing the same anti-affirmative action arguments that it rejected during the Reagan and first Bush administrations. Instead, given the Court's propensity to act within the constraints of majoritarian influences, the question was not whether the Court would disavow affirmative action, but whether it would meaningfully limit the power of colleges and universities to make race-based admissions decisions. For example, the Court could have demanded that schools first pursue race-neutral schemes before resorting to race-conscious ones. Similarly, the Court could have found that a school's pursuit of a "critical mass" of disadvantaged minorities was tantamount to a quota. 90 "Vith elected offito "prohibit public agencies from considering race and gender in hiring, public-works construction, and school admissions). 87 See Davis S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors join Attack on Racial Politics, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at A1 (describing how the backlash against affirmative action has gained support from few governors). 88 Fryer, supra note 86, at A1 (noting the anti-affirmative action campaign alienated minority voters). Ironically, former California Governor Pete Wilson made his opposition to affirmative action a centerpiece of his 1996 bid for the Republican presidential nomination. Paul Taylor, Wilson }"'ormally joins Presidential Race, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1995, at AS (describing Wilson's plan to make affirmative action a central issue in his campaign). 89 Fryer, supra note 86, at AI ("Republicans across the nation are largely following the lead of President Bush, who has largely avoided the affirmative-action issue."). In Florida, lawyers for Governor Jeb Bush, claiming that a proposed affirmative action initiative violated state law, went to court to block it. Jackie Hallifax, Connerly Petitions Argued, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2000, at SB. By opposing affirmative action in higher education, however, Jeb Bush energized minority voters-so much so that a dramatic increase in minority voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election nearly cost his brother the \\'hite House. See MAYER, supra note 78, at 289 (concluding that "[w]ithout that surge in black support for Gore, Bush would have won Florida [and thus, the \\'bite House] without the help of the Supreme Court"). 90 This was the conclusion reached by the federal district court judge hearing the Michigan law school case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (2001) ("[B]y using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of un-cials opposing quotas and opinion polls showing popular opposition to racial preferences in college admissions (despite a poll showing that eighty percent of Americans also think it important for colleges to have "a racially diverse student body"), 91 proponents of affirmative action had reason to fear the Court would approve affirmative action but narrow the ways in which schools could consider race. During the course of the Grutter litigation, proponents' fears gave way to a growing recognition that social and political pressures strongly favored Supreme Court approval of preferential admissions policies. In addition to overwhelming support by government and interest group amici, developments outside the Court highlighted the costs of a Court decision invalidating or severely limiting preferences.92 In other words, notwithstanding the fact that most Americans oppose race-conscious admissions, majoritarian forces weighed heavily in favor of the Rehnquist Court's approval of affirmative action. * * * Social and political forces beating against the Court in the Grutter and Gratz cases include the amicus filings by both interest groups and lawmakers, the Bush administration's decision to embrace racial diversity as an important and legitimate governmental end, the continuing salience of race discrimination in judicial confirmation politics, the ouster of Senate majority leader Trent Lott for making racially insensitive comments, and the awareness of the difficulties of implementing a Court ruling barring or severely limiting race-conscious admissions. In the pages that follow, this Essay will examine each of these factors.
A. Amicus filings
One hundred two amicus briefs were filed in Grutter and Gratzeighty-three supporting the University of Michigan and nineteen supporting the petitioners. The gap between supporters and opponents derrepresented minority students ... the current admissions policy [is] practically indistinguishable from a quota system."). (Jan. 27, 2003) . 92 See infra text accompanying notes 110-17 (describing the political developments that caused the Bush administration's embrace of racial diversity in higher education).
of affirmative action, however, was far more lopsided than this four-toone ratio. Consider the following: no member of Congress opposed the University. Indeed, one hundred twenty-four members of the House and thirteen Senators joined four briefs supporting the university, which emphasized that the federal government had repeatedly endorsed race-conscious decision making as constitutional, and argued that the Court should give deference to the constitutionally significant opinions of the other branches. 93 Though all brief signers were Democrats, four moderate Republicans made public their support of the university. In a letter to President Bush, Senators Lincoln Chafee, Olympia Snowe, Susan Collins, and Arlen Specter urged the administration to "support the position that diversity is a compelling government interest." 94 States also rallied behind the University. Unlike earlier challenges to the constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative action (where states typically did not file briefs), 95 twenty-three states and the Virgin Islands joined one of three briefs supporting the university. 96 These briefs argued that the university's determination that a diverse student body is a compelling interest that "falls within the institutional autonomy afforded to universities . . . and should, therefore, be afforded deference.',97 Only one state, Florida, filed a brief supporting the peti- tioner. In it, Florida argues that diversity can be pursued without racial preferences, and points to its own experiences with a race-neutral admissions scheme, which includes a program whereby the top twenty percent of high school seniors are guaranteed admission to state universities. 98 Big-business, labor, education, and civil-rights interests also backed the university. While these interests had all embraced the constitutionality of racial preferences prior to the Michigan cases, support for the Michigan plans was more emphatic than it had been in earlier affirmative action cases. Ninety-one colleges and universities, as well as every major educational association, filed briefs in support of the university. Not one college or university filed a brief opposing affirmative action. 99 These briefs argued that "pluralistic, widely representative" colleges provide a more enriching learning environment and better preparation for life in a multiracial world/ 00 and that a racially integrated student body is "critical to American democracy" because, among other things, a significant number of highranking public officials are graduates of elite colleges and universi-(arguing that Bakke harmonizes equal protection, academic freedom and federalism by "giving a degree of deference to a public university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits" Correspondingly, briefs filed by Fortune 500 companies and other business interests 102 claim that business needs a diverse pool of potential employees in order to compete effectively in the global marketplace. To achieve this diversity objective, schools must be able to consider race. This emphatic, near-unanimous reaffirmation of affirmative action helped propel the University of Michigan affirmative action programs. Perhaps more significantly, a coalition of former high-ranking officers and civilian leaders of the military (including William Crowe, Bud McFarlane, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Anthony Zinni) joined forces with longstanding supporters of affirmative action. In a brief that figured prominently in both oral arguments and the Court's decision, 103 the "military brief' linked "the military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security" with existing preferential treatment programs at the nation's military academies and its ROTC programs. 104 Noting the problems of low morale and heightened racial tension in Vietnam, the brief argued that "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to command our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the mili-
,105 ar y.
The amicus curiae filings in Grutter and Gratz are a testament to the breadth and intensity of support for affirmative action. tailing the perceived benefits of affirmative action, they provided the Court with information it could use to explain why racial diversity is a compelling government interest.
107
In sharp contrast, opponents of affirmative action remained politically isolated. The only notable brief that supported this position was an ambiguous filing by the Bush administration.
108
But as I will discuss that brief probably did more harm to their cause than good. Indeed, when compared to other controversial social issues (abortion or religion in the schools), the absence of important, powerful voices on one side of the issue seems es-. 11 k ]()<J peoa y star .
B. Trent Lott and the Bush Brief
The biggest boost for affirmative action may have come from an unlikely source: George W. Bush. On January 15, 2003, the President Court, 50 POL. REs. Q. 365, 377 ( 1997 REv. 743, 830 (2000) , which concludes that this "interest group model ... finds only equivocal support" and defends, instead, a "traditional legal model" that focuses on whether amici submit legally relevant information to the Court that is not already supplied by the parties to the case. In Grutter and Gratz, amicus support for the University of Michigan did provide the Court with legally relevant information. See infra text accompanying notes 139-40 (discussing citations to amicus filin!?,s in the Court's opinion). 07 announced that he "strongly support[s] diversity . . . including racial diversity in higher education," but that he considered the University of Michigan's affirmative action plans to be "[a]t their core" an unconstitutional "quota system."
110
The very next day, the George W. Bush Justice Department submitted a brief that, "far from insisting that any consideration of race was impermissible, did not even ask the justices to overturn the Bakke decision, ... [instead] allowing race to be used as a 'plus factor."' 111 The brief argued that government "may not employ race-based means without considering race-neutral alternatives and employing them if they would prove efficacious."
112
In other words, unlike the absolutist filings of the Reagan and first Bush administrations, the Bush Justice Department sought to steer a middle path on racial preferences. Indeed, following the Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz, the President declared victory, "applaud[ing] the Supreme Court for recognizing the value of diversity on our Nation's political advisors told him that he must do better with minority voters to win reelection.''" Otherwise, growing minority populations, especially in closely divided states, could undermine his reelection bid."" Fears of alienating minority voters were driven home when several high-ranking minority appointees expressed their support for affirmative action both during internal deliberations about the Michigan d . bl" c 117 cases an 1n pu 1c LOrums. Following racially insensitive remarks of then Senate majority leader Trent Lott, the President had little choice but to publicly embrace racial diversity in higher education (if not the University of Michigan plans themselves). In December 2002, Senator Lott appeared to embrace the segregationist appeals of Strom Thurmond's 1948 presidential campaign. 118 The President immediately denounced Senator Lott for making statements that "do not reflect the spirit of our country" and, at least implicitly, "distanced himself from the Senate majority leader."
119
When the administration filed its brief in January 2003, there was little question that the Lott imbroglio helped push the administration towards its middle ground position. The political pressures that pushed the Bush administration to distance itself from past Republican administrations underscore a simple fact: twenty-five years after the Supreme Court signaled that race can be "a factor" in college and university admissions, 121 affirmative action has become so entrenched that the costs of taking a stand 122 against it are greater now than ever before.
For the Supreme Court, these same social and political forces call attention to the institutional cost of opposing affirmative action. Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military, the Court understands that it must act in ways that gamer public acceptance.
123
A Court decision that is ignored or skirted does the Court little good. Likewise, the Court can be hurt by a decision that prompts a political backlash.
124
When deciding Grutter and Gratz, the Justices had reason to believe that the Court could not stop colleges and universities from devising race-conscious admissions strategies. A brief filed by the University of Texas Law School in a 1996 preferential admissions case warned: "If affirmative action is ended, inevitable political, economic and legal forces will pressure the great public universities to [find ways 121 I use the word "signaled" because this feature of Justice Powell's opinion in Regents v. Bakke may well have been dicta. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-42 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that Justice Powell's claim that diversity is a compelling government interest is a binding precedent), with id. at 785-87 (Boggs,]. dissenting) (arguing that Powell's claim is dicta). See also Alan]. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 381, 390 (1998) (concluding that lower courts should not treat Powell's claim as binding precedent and should "feel free to reach their own conclusions about the ~ropriety of employing racial preferences in the admission process"). 22 At the time of Bakke, affirmative action was not entrenched. The Carter administration, for example, almost filed a brief opposing preferential admissions in Bakke. See JOSEPH A. CALIFAl'\10, JR., GOVERNING fu\1ERICA 236-40 (1981) (discussing the Justice Department's draft brief, which argued that racial classifications were "presumptively unconstitutional"). Today it is almost inconceivable that a Democratic administration would oppose affirmative action.
123 This, of course, is why Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as "the least dangerous" branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) . For much the same reason, an empirical study by psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell confirmed that "the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacy ... enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions." Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionmy Legal Autharity: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE LJ. 703, 715 (1994) ; see also supra text accompanying note 18 (noting propensity of swing Justices to take account of social and political forces).
124 For additional discussion of how the Court takes account of whether elected officials will implement or subvert its decisions, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. [Vol. 152: 347 to maintain minority enrollments] ."
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Consider, for example, plans guaranteeing admission to the top ten or twenty percent of high school seniors. Although ostensibly race-neutral, these plans are designed to ensure that a set percentage of Mrican Americans and Hispanics secure admission to flagship state universities.
126
Another example of an ostensibly race-neutral plan designed to boost minority enrollment is the UCLA School of Law's creation of a separate admissions procedure for students interested in enrolling in that school's Critical Race Studies program. Although this program is open to students of all races, this initiative is an example of so-called "proxies" used to attract minority students.
127
Other proxies include "greater faculty discretion" in admissions decisions and greater attention to "socio-economic" status. Considering the widespread support for affirmative action in Congress and the states, there is little question that a Court decision that rejected both of the Michigan plans would have quickly spilled over to the confirmation process. By ruling in favor of affirmative action (as well as gay rights and family leave protections), the Court helped neutralize Senate Democrat complaints. 132 In other words, Justices who do not strongly disapprove of racial preferences would have good reason to steer clear of this controversy, 133 especially since it is doubtful that colleges and universities would truly conform to a Supreme Court decision calling for color-blind admissions. Likewise, six Justices explicitly ruled that both quotas and mechanical formulas that award a certain number of points to all minority students are unconstitutional 137 (and a seventh, Justice John
Paul Stevens, sidestepped that question) .
138
The least surprising feature of the Court's rulings is its conclusion that racial diversity is a compelling governmental interest. Mainstream amici (even those, like the Bush administration and State of Florida, who thought that the two Michigan programs went too far) were unanimous in their embrace of racial diversity.
139
In Orutter, the majority relied on these amicus filings and cited briefs by the Bush administration, educational associations, colleges and law schools, big business, and the so-called "military brief." 140 It did not matter that 134 Indeed, for only the second time in its history, the Court allowed for the live broadcast of oral arguments in the case. This decision reflected the Justices recognition of "the extraordinary public interest" in the case. Eavesdropping on Histary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A20. 135 For the same reason, it is unsurprising that the Court would find that colleges and universities may take race into account. In particular, once the Bush administration signaled that preferential admissions schemes are sometimes constitutional, majoritarian forces overwhelmingly supported the Court reaching a similar conclusion. 143
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had never voted to approve a racebased preference scheme, undoubtedly saw her approval of preferential admissions as simply cementing the status quo (with business, educational, and elected government interests all backing preferences).144 More tellingly, the dissenting opinions in Grutterunderscore the breadth of support for affirmative action. Not only did swing Justice Anthony Kennedy explicitly embrace race-conscious university admissions, Chief Justice Rehnquist never questioned whether race can be used in admissions. Instead, his dissent was limited to how the law school took race into account. 145
The real question in Grutter and Gratz was how much latitude schools would have when employing race and, relatedly, whether the Court would approve one of the University of Michigan plans. As I will now explain, the Court's decisions were a picture-perfect reflec-141 The term "respectable" was used by Bill Van Alstyne when discussing the sources of support upon which the Court relied in its opinion. Discussion with Bill Van Alstyne, William R. Perkins and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law School, in Williamsburg, VA (Feb. 2003). 142 Even though the Court's citation to amicus briefs showed that opponents of affirmative action were politically isolated, it may also be that these briefs were cited because they alerted the Justices to legally relevant information. See supra text accompanying note 106 (noting that these briefs gave the Court information it could use in formulating its opinion). tion of the social and political forces beating against it. With that said, I am not contending that the Court had no choice but to approve one of the two Michigan programs. A decision, for example, approving some race-based admissions schemes but striking down both plans as mechanistic quota-like systems would have reflected social and political forces. Such a decision would have appealed to a Justice like Anthony Kennedy, who found the Michigan plans offensive but still wanted to take social and political forces into account. 146
Nevertheless, social and political forces strongly supported the Court's decision to uphold the law school program that purportedly provided "meaningful individualized review of applicants," 147 while striking down the undergraduate program because it did not consider "the particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individual applicant." 148 A decision striking down both programs-even one that recognized that individualized treatment of race is constitutionally permissible-would have come at a cost. As previously mentioned/49 such a decision might have been portrayed as anti-civil rights and spilled over to confirmation politics and the 2004 elections. In addition to placing the Court in the middle of a political imbroglio, a decision striking down both programs (while recognizing that race diversity is a compelling interest) would have clarified very little. In response, colleges and universities likely would either come forward with new affirmative action plans or new explanations as to why they have no choice but to adhere to existing preferential admission programs.150 Over time, there would be new circuit conflicts and increas-146 Along the same lines, Justice O'Connor's approval of the law school plan may well have been tied to her belief that the Court must work to achieve "both the perception and the reality of equal justice" because "a substantial number of our citizens believe our legal judicial system is unresponsive to them because of racial bias. 'What then can we take from Justice Scalia's claim that the Court's qualified approval of racial preferences "seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation"?
152 For Justice Scalia, future litigation would examine whether a school's consideration of race, in fact, is individualized, and whether the school's expressed commitment to diversity is a mere smokescreen to disguise discriminatory admissions. These claims, however, ignore the Court's methodology in Grutter and Gratz. Specifically, the Court drew a sharp line between admissions systems that purportedly allow for independent consideration of each applicant and "nonindividualized [and] mechanical" formulae that mandate that all minority applicants be placed in a separate admissions pool, be given a specified number of bonus points, etc. 153 For the majority, the latter category is clearly impermissible, while the former category is subjected to deferential review and is almost certainly permissible. In Grutter, for example, the Court "[took] the law school at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula" and that it considers each applicant's claim that she will add to the school's diversity. 154
The fact that the law school distinguished among groups of underrepresented minorities (preferring Mrican Americans to Hispanics and Native Americans) was considered irrelevant. 155 Likewise, the Court saw no reason to discuss why it was that the law school seemed to look to the percentage of Mrican Americans in its applicant pool in determining how many admissions offers it would extend to Mrican Americans.156 Finally, the Court did not explore why the percentage of interest in race diversity can only be pursued through race-conscious admissions schemes). 151 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (noting the differences in the "critical mass" of students sought from different minority groups). The majority opinion did not respond. 156 See id. at 2368-69 ("But the correlation between the percentage of the law school's pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the UNIVE-'RSITY OF P.t,'NNSYL VANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 347 minority offers "at no point fell below 12%, historically defined by the Law School as the bottom of its critical mass range." 157 By granting broad latitude to colleges and universities that employ ostensibly individualized admissions systems, Gruttervalidates claims by lawmakers and elites about both the importance of race diversity and the difficulties schools face when pursuing this end. Majoritarian forces did not support the validation of the undergraduate admissions. While elected officials, interest groups, and newspapers overwhelmingly back preferences, quotas are taboo. 158 More significantly, public opinion polls support the placing of limits on affirmative action. These polls show that the American people, while supporting racial diversity in higher education, oppose racial preferences. 159 Opinion polls, however, also reveal that the Court has significant leeway to decide what kinds of affirmative action are constitutionally permissible. For instance, fewer than one in five white voters claimed that affirmative action would play a significant role in sorting out their presidential preference, 160 and one day after Californians approved an anti-affirmative action initiative, an exit poll revealed that neither Republicans nor Democrats would rank affirmative action as one of the percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be discussed as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to the numbers."'). 157 I d. at 237I (Kennedy,J., dissenting); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, AALS NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2003, at I (suggesting that Michigan Law School had a "rough target percentage of minorities," and that the school "might increase" the weight given to race "to ensure that the target was met"). The majority, however, did note that the range of minority students in each class "varied from I3.5 to 20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota." I23 S. Ct. at 2343. In response, the dissenters noted both that the law school monitored the number of minority students who accepted its offers, id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and, correspondingly, that the school could only control who it made offers to, not who enrolled at the law school. /d. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 158 Even Bill Clinton, a strong advocate of racial preferences, rejected mechanical formulas designed to ensure proportionate minority representation. See Lewis, supra note 74, at AI (discussing Clinton's withdrawal of Lani Guinier's nomination in response to Senate Democrat complaints). Correspondingly, I do not think that the Court felt pressure to uphold the college plan because amici, instead of distinguishing the two plans, argued that both plans were constitutional. The Court knew that the concern of amici was the approval of racial preferences and the granting of wide latitude to colleges and universities in implementing affirmative action programs. This is precisely what the Court did and, not surprisingly, amici were oveljoyed by the Court's mling. See infra text accompanying notes I67-68 (recounting popular expressions of support for the Court's approval of diversity as a permissible goal). 159 Langer, supra note 91. 160 Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Stranger Career of Affinnative Action, 59 OHIO ST. LJ.
997, IOOI (I998).
HeinOnline --152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 381 2003 Rev. 381 -2004 2003] t:XPLAINING GRUTJER V. BOLLINGER 381 top seven issues facing voters. 161 Thus, Americans would certainly accept a decision approving some, but not all, racial preferences. The question of how much latitude the Court was giving universities simply would not register with most voters.
The Court therefore had strong reason not to give colleges and universities a carte blanche to sort out if and when race should be taken into account. 162 By upholding the law school's "individualized" consideration of race while rejecting the college's across-the-board plan, '" [ t] he court comes across as temperate, reflecting the complexity of opinion in the public itself. "' 163 Furthermore, knowing that its decisions would be embraced by elected officials and opinion leaders, the Court (by ruling against the college in the face of widespread amicus support for the college) was able to appear independent and countermajoritarian without worrying about possible political reprisals. CONCLUSION Reaction to the Court's approval of race-based preferences, not surprisingly, was overwhelmingly positive. The decisions were hailed 161 /d. 162 In Grutter,Justice O'Connor recognized the costs of giving colleges and universities unbounded authority. She notes that schools should, if possible, consider raceneutral alternatives. See 123 S. Ct. at 2346 ("Universities in other states can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop."). She also concluded her opinion by commenting that it "has been 25 years since [Bakke] " and that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." /d. at 2346-47. By qualifYing the Court's support for affirmative action, O'Connor signaled that her decision to uphold the law school program was tied to social and political forces, including her publicly expressed concern about the Court's need to improve its image on race issues. See ., dissenting) (suggesting that O'Connor would support a government program sponsoring individualized consideration of race in admissions, but not one as broad in its use of race as a qualification as was the one in this case). For Justice O'Connor, nonindividualized diversity preferences wrongly assumed that all minorities would make similar programming decisions. See id. ("To uphold the challenged programs, the Court departs ... from our traditional requirement that racial qualifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.") b'XPLAINING GRUTTt-:R V. BOLLJNGER 383 weight of the nation's changing demographics. In particular, with an increasingly diverse and ever-growing minority population, there is good reason to question the political saliency of affirmative action plans that are limited to just a few groups. 170 In the short run, however, the Court has responded to social and political pressures. Its decision, moreover, seems designed to keep the Court out of this thicket and return the issue to the states, where schools, elected officials, and voter initiatives can sort out the details of racial preferences. In so doing, Grutter and Gratz are emblematic of the Rehnquist Court's practice of operating within parameters set by social and political forces. 
